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author | Laurent Bercot <ska-skaware@skarnet.org> | 2022-10-14 02:28:41 +0000 |
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committer | Laurent Bercot <ska@appnovation.com> | 2022-10-14 02:28:41 +0000 |
commit | 0514473421d32a11971d454b459787fe87e9c5ab (patch) | |
tree | dbb609bb469da915f6f4a89c36a5a5e8051abd33 /doc | |
parent | fca2bc64b691cac529625a8ad36aefe9a4f9ad59 (diff) | |
download | s6-networking-0514473421d32a11971d454b459787fe87e9c5ab.tar.xz |
Bring libsbearssl doc up to date.
Also fix a typo in sbearssl.h
Signed-off-by: Laurent Bercot <ska@appnovation.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'doc')
-rw-r--r-- | doc/libsbearssl/index.html | 117 |
1 files changed, 113 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/doc/libsbearssl/index.html b/doc/libsbearssl/index.html index d8ea6ee..64a7c0b 100644 --- a/doc/libsbearssl/index.html +++ b/doc/libsbearssl/index.html @@ -510,6 +510,110 @@ but at least <tt>SSL_PROTOCOL=value</tt> and <tt>SSL_CIPHER=value</tt> are transmitted. The function returns 1 if it succeeds and 0 if it fails. </p> +<h3> X.509 validation with some information extraction </h3> + +<p> + A <tt>sbearssl_x509_small_context</tt> structure is an implementation of the +<tt>br_x509_class</tt> type that is a little more powerful than the +<tt>br_x509_minimal_context</tt> implementation provided by BearSSL: +running a certificate chain through a <tt>sbearssl_x509_small_context</tt> +validator allows you to get the hash of the End Entity certificate in the +chain, as well as the DN it certifies. +</p> + +<h4> <code> void sbearssl_x509_small_init_full (sbearssl_x509_small_context *ctx, br_x509_trust_anchor *btas, size_t n, sbearssl_dn *eedn, uint8_t *eltstatus, char *eehash) </code> </h4> + +<p> + Initializes the validator in <em>*ctx</em> with the list of <em>n</em> +trust anchors pointed to by <em>btas</em>. <em>eehash</em> must point +to a user-supplied buffer of at least 32 bytes, which will contain the +sha256 hash of the EE certificate after validation. <em>eedn</em> must point +to a user-supplied <tt>sbearssl_dn</tt> structure that will contain the +DN of the end entity after validation. <em>eltstatus</em> must point to a +user-supplied <tt>uint8_t</tt>, which after validation encodes the status +of DN extraction: bit 7 of <em>eltstatus</em> is set if there was an issue during extraction (in +which case the contents of <em>*eedn</em> are meaningless) and clear if +everything went well, and bits 0 to 6 are set iff the corresponding element +of the DN is present, by increasing order C, ST, L, O, OU and CN. +</p> + +<h4> <code> int sbearssl_x509_small_set_tai (sbearssl_x509_small_context *ctx, tai const *t) </code> </h4> +<h4> <code> int sbearssl_x509_small_set_tain (sbearssl_x509_small_context *ctx, tain const *a) </code> </h4> + +<p> + Like their <tt>sbearssl_x509_minimal_set_tai</tt> and <tt>sbearssl_x509_minimal_set_tain</tt> +counterparts, but for <tt>sbearssl_x509_small_context</tt> validators instead of +<tt>br_x509_minimal_context</tt> ones. +</p> + +<h3> Server-side SNI support </h3> + +<p> + A <tt>sbearssl_sni_policy_context</tt> structure is an implementation of the +<tt>br_ssl_server_policy_class</tt> type that supports Server Name Identification, +unlike the default <tt>br_ssl_server_policy_rsa_context</tt> and +<tt>br_ssl_server_policy_ec_context</tt> implementations provided by BearSSL that +only support a single certificate chain. +</p> + +<p> + During preparation, the user fills the structure with as many keypairs as they wish; +then at handshake time, depending on the ServerName requested by the client, +the relevant keypair is kept and used, and all the other ones are wiped from memory. +</p> + +<h4> <code> void sbearssl_sni_policy_init (sbearssl_sni_policy_context *pol) </code> </h4> + +<p> + Initializes the user-supplied <em>*pol</em> structure. +</p> + +<h4> <code> int sbearssl_sni_policy_add_keypair_file (sbearssl_sni_policy_context *pol, char const *servername, char const *certfile, char const *keyfile) </code> </h4> + +<p> + This function reads a PEM-encoded certificate chain in the file <em>certfile</em>, +and a corresponding PEM- or DER-encoded private key in the file <em>keyfile</em>. +It registers them with the <em>*pol</em> structure as the keypair to use if the +client requests the <em>servername</em> ServerName. Wildcards are supported in +<em>servername</em> except on TLDs. If <em>servername</em> is empty, then the +keypair is registered as a default, to use when no ServerName matches (or when +the client doesn't request SNI). +</p> + +<p> + The function returns 0 on success. It returns a negative value in +case of a system error, in which case <tt>errno</tt> identifies the +error. It returns a positive value in case of an error returned by +a BearSSL decoder, in which case an appropriate message can be +obtained with the <tt>sbearssl_error_str()</tt> function. +</p> + +<h4> <code> size_t sbearssl_sni_policy_nkeypairs (sbearssl_sni_policy_context const *pol) </code> </h4> + +<p> + Returns the number of keypairs currently registered with <em>*pol</em>. +</p> + +<h4> <code> void sbearssl_sctx_init_full_generic (br_ssl_server_context *sc) </code> </h4> + +<p> + Not directly related to SNI support, but complementary to it. This function is +a high-level function missing from BearSSL: it fully initializes a +<tt>br_ssl_server_context</tt> structure, registering all the cipher suites +and all the hashes provided by BearSSL with a good degradation order, +supporting TLS 1.0 to TLS 1.2, etc. What it doesn't set: the engine buffer, +the certificate policy, the optional engine flags, and the optional client +certificate validation. +</p> + +<h4> <code> void sbearssl_sctx_set_policy_sni (br_ssl_server_context *sc, sbearssl_sni_policy_context *pol) </code> </h4> + +<p> + Registers <em>*pol</em> as the certificate policy for the <em>*sc</em> +server context. This tells BearSSL that the handshake will support SNI +and use the keypairs registered with <em>*pol</em>. +</p> + <h3> Running the TLS/SSL engine (internal function for both clients and servers) </h3> <h4> <code> void sbearssl_run (br_ssl_engine_context *ctx, int *fds, tain const *tto, uint32_t options, unsigned int verbosity, sbearssl_handshake_cb_t_ref cb, sbearssl_handshake_cb_context_t *cbarg) </code> </h4> @@ -572,6 +676,13 @@ SSL/TLS connection closed cleanly, the process exits 0. <h3> Initializing and running the engine </h3> +<p> + The following functions are high-level interfaces and rely on all the +functions described above. They're the core of the +<a href="../s6-tlsc-io.html">s6-tlsc-io</a> and +<a href="../s6-tlsd-io.html">s6-tlsd-io</a> programs. +</p> + <h4> <code> void sbearssl_client_init_and_run (int *fds, tain const *tto, uint32_t preoptions, uint32_t options, unsigned int verbosity, char const *servername, sbearssl_handshake_cb_t_ref cb, unsigned int notif) </code> </h4> <p> @@ -606,8 +717,7 @@ the network. </li> the <tt>CERTFILE</tt> and <tt>KEYFILE</tt> environment variables are read, they must contain the path to a valid client certificate and private key (else the process exits 96); this certificate is then provided to the -server for client authentication. <strong>This feature is currently -unsupported and will not work; leave that bit clear for now.</strong> </li> +server for client authentication. </li> </ul> </li> <li> <tt>options</tt> : a bitfield, which will be passed to <tt>sbearssl_run()</tt>. @@ -636,8 +746,7 @@ completed. </li> argument is required. The <tt>CERTFILE</tt> and <tt>KEYFILE</tt> environment variables are mandatory, they point to the server's certificate and private key. It is only necessary to set <tt>CADIR</tt> or <tt>CAFILE</tt> when bit -0 of <em>preoptions</em> is set <strong>(this functionality <em>is</em> supported server-side)</strong>, -in which case client authentication will be +0 of <em>preoptions</em> is set, in which case client authentication will be requested, and a list of trust anchors (read from either the directory in <tt>CADIR</tt> or the PEM file in <tt>CAFILE</tt>) will be used to verify the client certificate. |